DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 192 300 CS 205 768

AUTHOR Jacobson, Thomas L.
TITLE Responses to the New International Information Order: The United States.
PUB DATE Aug 80
NOTE 27p.: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism (63rd, Boston, MA, August 9-13, 1980).

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Communications; *Developed Nations; *Developing Nations; Foreign Countries; Foreign Policy; *Freedom of Speech; *International Relations; Journalism; News Media; Policy Formation
IDENTIFIERS *United States

ABSTRACT

Third World nations' calls for a new international information crder are discussed and the responses of Western governments and in particular of the United States government to those calls are analyzed in this paper. The paper notes the Third World countries' preferences for a more restrictive flcw of information across borders, their limited interest in the use of technology to transmit information, and their internal policies of restricting access of information to less advantaged classes, positions that are not accepted by Western countries. Official Western government responses are described as having been expressed primarily thrcugh participation in United Nations sponsored conferences, especially those of UNESCO. An overview of these conferences and their major issues is provided. A discussion cf the reasons behind Western policies that promote a more open right to communicate includes mention of the profit motive and cold war diplomatic and political intentions. (MKM)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

ED192300

Responses to the New International Information Order:

The United States

Thomas L. Jacobson
Graduate Student
School of Communications
University of Washington
Seattle, Wa.
98195

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Thomas L. Jacobson

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

CS205768

Submitted to the International Division of the Association for Education in Journalism, Annual Conference, 1980 -- A student paper for the Markham competition. (1st Prize)

INTRODUCTION

It is often asserted by Western negotiators that the notion of a "Third World" is fallacious since it refers to countries having widely differing national and international policy needs. This is equally true when referring to the "Western" bloc. On the issues of energy, technology transfer, price stabilization, and others including communications, negotiating positions in international conferences often reflect a collage of shifting alliances of support, both within and between the Third World and the Western countries. Nevertheless, just as the Third World countries are bound together by their common experiences, formerly of colonialism and now of debt and dependence upon international markets and financing, so too are the industrialized countries bound by common experiences, and common foreign policy goals in the communications sphere.

The North-South agenda is definitely launched, although it is just getting off the ground, and whatever differences there are between the major industrial powers of the West today, they still must operate as a block in those conferences where North-South issues are on the agenda. In the field of communications the lines are drawn this way. Although the countries of the Third World are often as wary of the Soviet Union as they are of the Western powers, in this field especially the West has taken the initiative against Third World efforts to establish a New International Information Order (NIIO). For this reason the West is the primary opponent, even if it is a potential savior.

The fact of this division between the First and Third Worlds is not the important point, however, since it is very plain. The problem in an overview of Western NIIO policy is to discern the mechanisms of policy formulation and the motivations behind their employment. This is somewhat more difficult,

as is reflected in the writings of well known policy analysts in the communications field.

Professor Herbert Schiller of the University of California, San Diego, has argued that United States policy managers are reacting to the NIIO along three lines simultaneously -- governmental, technological, and diplomatic. He asserts that efforts made through these channels to organize communications policy and to influence the peoples of other countries are as conscious today as they were in the cold war.

Schiller is frequently criticized as a conspiracy theorist, although the label is not in any strict sense true.

> It would be mistaken to view the efforts that will be detailed in the following discussion as indicative of a master-plan, fully formulated and centrally implemented. It is much more reasonable to believe that the many and diverse components of the structure of authority in the American economy are reacting to perceived threats to their dominion." (1)

Nevertheless, common criticisms of his method of presentation seem justified, insofar as his analysis tends to line the various policy organizations almost into a battle line. As useful as Schiller's research is in portraying some of the bases of American communications policy formulation, he perhaps does not do enough to explain how the policy mechanisms actually operate, and in the process he seems to over-simplify them.

William H. Read of the Harvard Program on Information Technologies and Public Policy has a different analysis. According to Read, American communications industries' expansionism is purely motivated by profit. There are no attempts to deviously manipulate the minds of peoples in the Third World, nor is there a need for them. The Third World only provides a small proportion of these industries' profits. (2) Instead of three channels of influence managed by America's policy makers, businessmen and military personnel, it is some version of Adam Smith's "unseen hand" which organizes the work of inter-

national communications markets and their growth.

There is no problem of clarity in Read's presentation; he ascribes the motivation of communications transnationals to profit seeking in such a way as to make the Third World critics, and Schiller, seem false in their accusations.

Pointing out that the market mechanism is the bottom-line determinant of corporate behavior, however, is not sufficient to explain the basis of American corporate policy goals. It is true that profit is the corporate raison d'etre, as Schiller agrees. Yet this fact does not explain corporate global strategies or corproate involvement in governmental politics, which in one way or another certainly do underlie the call for an NIIO.

Cold war policy mechanisms, for example, often seem to still be in play. What role, if any, do they have in the NIIO debate? U. S. based international corporations have received government economic and military support at least since the U. S. annexed Hawaii in the late 1800s. What effects has this kind of support had in the field of communications? Even assuming the "fair play," of free economic competition internationally, the global economy is shifting substantially due to the growing strength of the Third World, with profound effects on the Western economies. The dialog between governments over this shift may have important economic motivations, but they certainly have political mechanisms as well. What roles do political strategies play in the Western response to to the demands for an NIIO? Can it be said that there is good will on the part of Western economic entities, or is the battle of neocolonialism to be considered the best of unfortunately poor alternatives?...

As useful as Schiller's and Read's research may be, it would be even more useful to articulate the numerous currents within the Western policy flow, instead of only characterizing them broadly. Or rather, it would seem that

upon the foundation of their work this articulation is now more easily possible.

With these questions in mind, I try here to describe some recent policy moves made by the West, and by the United States particularly, in the context of a brief history of the NIIO. But first, a caveat.

In 1974 economist Paul Sweezy explained that "It is a commonplace that in the last two years U. S. imperialism has been in a period of crisis." (3) Since then the problems of inflation, the devaluation of the dollar, and the recent revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua indicate that this crisis has only deepened. In a period of such change for the West, foreign policy guidelines are difficult to nail down, as President Carter has found. Western responses to calls for a New International Information Order do not seem to be any exception to this general uncertainty.

BACKGROUND

Official Western governments' responses to the NIIO have been expresseed primarily through their participation in United Nations sponsored conferences, especially those of UNESCO. UNESCO has been doing work in the field of communications almost since its establishment, based upon the goal of a global "free flow of information." But in the 1960's it began a new trend in its work. Whereas it had formerly dealt only with communications infrastructure development, assiduously avoiding the issue of communication content, in the 60's the Third World interest in "media imperialism" began to find representation in UNESCO's programs. (4)

It wasn't until the early 1970's that meetings of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries brought the issues of communications inequity to the fore of international debate, but throughout the period critiques were being raised by Third World countries. In 1972 the debate began.

At the 17th General Conference of UNESCO the Soviet Union sponsored the first version of what was to become in 1978 the Mass Media Declaration.* The fundamental tenants of the Declaration involved the responsibilities of nations to regulate the information flows moving in and out of their own countries. The Western countries as a group vigorously opposed the resolution, of course, due to their traditions of press freedom and to the U. S. adherence to the principle of a global free flow of information. (5) The Declaration was deferred to later meetings.

Another Soviet sponsored resolution at this 1972 conference called for a declaration of "guiding principles on the use of satellite broadcasting," including provisions for prior consent of receiving nations. This resolution passed 55 to 7, with the industrialized Western countries voting as a bloc.

A 1973 version of this resolution was passed in the General Assembly by a vote of 102 to 1, with the U. S. casting the only dissenting vote. This is perhaps the most graphic illustration of divisions of interest which exist between the industrialized nations on communications issues. The U. S. is far ahead of other nations in satellite and computer technology, and Europeans have often felt the need for protection from American strength in this field.

The participation of Third World votes in all these resolutions indicated growing awareness of communications issues, the basis upon which today's antagonisms rest. More significant for an analysis of Western policy, however, is the fact that the principal sponsor of these resolutions was the Soviet Union. The Non-Aligned movement was well under way by this time, and a great many countries voted irrespective of either major power, East or West. However, the USSR sponsorship of the early NIIO related resolutions in the U. N. certainly contributed to the reaction which the U. S. and other countries have had.

---

* Full name: Declaration on fundamental principles concerning the contribution of the mass media to strengthening peace and international understanding, to the promotion of human rights and to countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war.

Whether or not the Cold War reactions seen occasionally are correct and justified, they are in a certain sense understandable.

In 1974 at the 18th General Conference of UNESCO another version of the Mass Media Declaration written by a Swedish law expert was discussed with some vigor, but was delayed and referred to a meeting of experts to study the issue further. This meeting of experts took place the following year but was unsuccessful, and was marred by a walk-out of Western countries during an attempt to introduce a resolution equating Zionism and Racism.

In 1975 UNESCO hosted an Intergovernmental conference on communications and development in Latin America and the Caribbean where the issue of press freedom came up again. The mandate of the conference did not involve the drafting of resolutions on the matter, but by this time UNESCO had been typed in some circles as being simply a forum for revolutionary Third World interests. During the discussion, open hostility was expressed between the UNESCO staff and the representatives of the Inter American Press Association, an American dominated organization which has been found to have close CIA connections. (6)

These conferences running from 1972 through 1975 were very important in setting the initial agenda for the NIIO, but they were only a prelude to the real debate. The 19th General Conference of UNESCO is usually considered to be a watershed in the debate. Here, amid tempers, U. S. delegation head Ambassador John E. Reinhardt conceded implicitly that an imbalance exists and pledged assistance to Third World countries to "further develop their communications capacities."

The Mass Media Declaration was again raised and again tabled, with the help of compromise resolutions, one by Tunisia which mentioned the need for a Non-Aligned newspool, and another sponsored by the United States which requested the Director-General to hold further consultations with experts on

the broad issues of communications. This latter resolution led to the formation of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, or the McBride Commission. Once more in these votes against the Declaration the countries of Japan, West Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States voted as a bloc.

The U. S. endorsements of these compromise resolutions at Nairobi are now generally seen to have been time-buying tactics, allowing the West to formulate a comprehensive approach to the emerging NIIO. (7) Accompanying criticisms allege that the U. S. was not negotiating in good faith.

Whether the Nairobi conference compromises were made in good faith or were simply tactical maneuvers, the 20th General Conference in Paris in 1978 was more of the same. There were problems when the McBride Commission submitted its interim report and drew fire in formally submitted comments from the United States International Press Association, the Inter American Press Association, the International Federation of Newspaper Editors, the American Newspaper Publishers Association, and the United States government, although the debate as a whole endorsed the Commission's work.

On the other hand the Director-General acclaimed "an historic moment," after a finely wrought version of the Mass Media Declaration was finally passed, by consensus. (8) References to control over content of the media and to state responsibility were omitted from the draft, as concessions on the part of the Third World representatives and the Soviet Union. While matching concessions were made by the West, in that the traditionally symbolic phrse calling for a "free flow" of information was expanded to include "free flow and wider and more balanced dissemination of information." (9)

The full meaning of this conference is somewhat ambiguous. It was seen in some ways as a success for the Third World, bringing a fundamental tenet of the NIIO into formal recognition. But at the same time Ambassador Reinhardt was able to report to Congress that the Declaration endorses the principle of the free flow of information; that it does not endorse government control of the media; and that it ensures journalists and reporters the "best condition for exercising their profession." (10)

Ambassador Reinhardt also offered aid in the form of training and satellite access for rural development programs to the Third World, suggesting that Third World countries work together with the U.S. in a cooperative way to remedy the imbalance of information. But some feel that this too was largely a ploy. Kaarle Nordenstreng has characterized the U.S. position in critical terms: "This approach reduces the idea of a new order to the transfer of know-how and technology." (11) Along with Nordenstreng many have thought that the New Order was not directly addressed at all.

WESTERN RESPONSES

It has been within this overall framework of the NIIO's emergence that the specific issues of journalistic freedom, technology transfer, culture and information flow, etc. have been argued. At the 20th Session the most central and most ideologically loaded issue was that of sovereignty over information. Although the imbalance of information flow in the quantitative sense has been the easiest to document and hence the most practical work within negotiations, it has been the resolutions based upon Third World desires to manage the quality or content of this information which have drawn the most resistance from the West.

Reinhardt formally conceded the general imbalance in his statement to UNESCO in 1978, but the U. S. delegation supported nothing which might lead to establishment of mechanisms of control over professional journalistic dis-

cretion. Other major industrialized countries of the West joined the U.S. in this resistance.

Resolutions on "The Status of the Responsibilities of Journalists' repeatedly appeared for example, and West Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom voiced strong reservations on these during debate. More broadly, Denmark suggested that, "In the field of communication UNESCO perhaps ought to confine itself to the building of infrastructure and to training personnel rather than concern itself with the content of communication." (12) Canada too expressed this sentiment: "...governments should not be encouraged to take on the power to bring about a "balance" in the flow of information between countries. Such imbalances could be corrected by improving the quality of media production and the mechanisms of their distribution." This statement of Canada's is interesting in that Canada itself has a very serious imbalance problem: with the U.S.

Questions of culture have received a different kind of treatment. Presumably, cultural information flow exhibits imbalances in the same way that news flow does, but since the West feels no reservations about promoting culture, efforts to deal with it have been more favorably received, in some ways at least.

The Canadian delegation at the 20th Session offered to host activities launching "international mass media and culture programs." Australia offered to co-operate with UNESCO on the development and dissemination of a report on cinema and society. A resolution was passed setting up a committee to study procedures for the protection and storage of "moving images," or film and video discs, etc., of cultural value.

General debate did touch on the more sensitive topics of ideology and mass media in the Third World, but no resolutions were seriously discussed.

The issue of the cultural implications of technology transfer, for example, did not receive any more attention than that given it during the numerous general addresses.

The Right to Communicate issue, which has been visible for some time, received renewed support during the 20th Session and appeared in indirect ways throughout the Declaration. It was received favorably by all countries, but it was the two more progressive countries of the West, Sweden and Finland, which gave it full support. Stated generally it lends a freedom of speech aura to the text of resolutions in which it is included, but addressed directly it quickly raises the questions of access to media. Where access can be construed to refer to the matter of journalistic access the West supports it, but where it is a matter of access by less advantaged classes, through government subsidy, it is not.

The varying degrees of support given to issues like the right to communicate by different countries illustrate again that differences exist between countries of the West. As mentioned above, the U.S. is almost alone in some of its satellite policy initiatives.

There are more. On the problem of transborder data flow the U.S. is once more something of an outsider, although differences are expressed between the other industrialized countries as well. France and Sweden, for example, forbid the transborder flow of personal data whereas West Germany does not. (13) In the area of news transmission there are also differences. The Japanese news agency, Kyoto, cooperates with the Tanjug and receives some of its material daily, even though Japan is aligned with the Western bloc on most issues on the NIIO. The other agencies do not work with Tanjug. (14)

Thus, as is evident they do not always cooperate as a bloc. Moreover it is sometimes difficult to discern the meanings of bloc votes. The con-

census, or acclamation, method of voting used by the United Nations is often difficult to use in interpreting countries' positions. There may be disagreements which votes do not register. It is also clear, however, that the major industrialized democracies have usually worked together on major issues.

THE UNITED STATES

The surest way to note a country's position is through the resolutions it sponsors or co-sponsors. and, according to this, one thing is clear. The United States is the centerpole of the West's response to the NIIO. Differences on certain issues notwithstanding, the U.S. organizes support for and sponsors more resolutions than any other developed country. In fact, at the 20th Session, the U.S. was the only developed country to sponsor resolutions on significant NIIO topics, and it did receive the support and/or co-sponsorship of other developed countries where needed.

After the mass media declaration was passed, Tunisia tried to slip in an unexpected resolution requesting the intensification of development projects and research. The plan called for a multilateral, UNESCO managed fund for communications projects, funded by required contributions from all member states. The United States and seven other industrialized nations produced a masterfully speedy compromise resolution and regained the initiative by proposing a planning meeting for such a fund and research management commission to be held in Washington D.C.

The U. S. also organized and sponsored a resolution requesting the McBride Commission to address "concrete and practical" proposals contributing to the rectification of the international information flow imbalance. (15)

Until 1976 the United States and the West generally tried to ignore the emerging NIIO, hoping that it would not amount to much. The Nairobi General Conference dashed this hope, however, and in a report to the Committee on

Foreign Relations a year later one analyst bluntly admitted that,"Whether we like it or not, there will be a "New World Information Order," (16) It could be the driving force and the fuel for the "New World Economic Order," called for by the Less Developed Nations."

It is this recognition which has led the United States away from its formerly intransigent position, recently, to adopt a posture of strategic cooperation with the Third World. It has been stated many times in the last year. Senior media consultant to the United States UNESCO delegation William Harley made explicit recommendations for cooperation as a tool for gaining leadership in forging the NIIO, at a Fletcher School conference in Boston, in October of 1979.

> "This, it seems to me, is the approach the U.S. should take toward the NWIO -- select from among the varied political and ideological issues those on which there is some likelihood of agreement and which are susceptible to resolution by practicable cooperation. Then the U.S. should join with Japan and other countries with well-developed communications to exert leadership in shaping a new world order of communications, cooperatively developed by all, rather than prescribed by the nonaligned countries." (17)

It is in this context that U.S. communications since the 20th Session should be seen. As mentioned, at Paris a compromise resolution involving a communications consultative group was offered by the United States, in opposition to a Tunisian bid to set up an International Fund for communications. Some Third World communications experts say they were misled by Reinhardt, and given the idea that some version of their fund would remain a part of the group, to be planned at the meeting in the United States.

The meeting was held in November of 1979 and ended in a shambles. The Third World interests had expected a plan for a consultation group based upon a multi-lateral fund, to which the U. S. would pledge 25 million dollars.

The U.S. offered no such thing, offering instead to participate only in a bilateral funding program, on a voluntary basis. Such a response in essence reduced the fund to a booking agency.

Since this failed meeting was in preparation for an April conference whose mandate it is to establish the consultative group, the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and the ICA have been working very hard to put together something which the U.S. can offer there. The notable problem of this effort is in trying to determine the cause of the poor communications which led to the confusion and subsequent scrambling. The strategy of cooperation is apparent, but the tactics are not. It looks rather as if they haven't really been worked out yet, even at this late date.

Something is being done however. In December the U.S UNESCO Commission, which is a State Department body, held its 43rd Annual Conference in Athens, Georgia, for the purpose of sounding out proposals for "an American Agenda for a new world communications order." (18) The aim of this conference was primarily to address the problematic situation left after the consultative group planning conference. Judging from the rapporteur's summary the recommendations which emerged from its working groups conform to those which have been made recently by other U.S. spokespersons, including Harley, Reinhardt and George Dalley.

In Boston, Harley had recommended that the U.S. should be intransigent on restrictions of news flow; on the issue of a universal code of ethics for journalists; on the licensing or protection of journalists; and on the international right of reply. These proposals, he explained, would inhibit the free flow of information and restrict journalists' efforts to practice their jobs. (19)

Alternatively, he urged that the U.S. ought to be cooperative on the issues of reductions in postal and communications tariff rates, on satellite access, and on development assistance.

The National Commission conference upheld these recommendations, and proposed further that private interests form a body to lobby Congress on the importance of communications foreign aid, and the need to increase trade in communications products. It also saw the need to strengthen exchange and training programs. As well, it suggested that a mechanism be established to monitor the developments in communications issues at the United Nations and UNESCO.

In general the conference recommended that the United States government formulate a comprehensive and systematic international communications policy.

Some of these recommendations are already being acted upon ; ICA is presently trying to put together a catalog of U.S. training programs, University exchange programs and grant channels for Third World media managers -- although some Universities have been reluctant to associate themselves too closely with ICA, others have been cooperative. "Training and personnel exchange programs" is one of the few areas where the 1980 ICA budget request is higher than it was in 1979. (20)

On the problem of technology the U.S. has submitted a paper to the McBride Commission, written by Ithiel de Sola Pool. (21) The paper chides some Third World countries for not welcoming with open arms U.S. offers of technology, equating rejection of new satellite program offers with the hypothetical example of these same countries having rejected the use of transistorized radios when they first appeared.

One program in which the United States independent research section has the initiative is the establishment of "an independent, international committee

to monitor and evaluate proposals for resolving the dispute over the international flow of information between industrialized countries and the Third World." (22) Specifically, the committee will evaluate the McBride Commission Report. It was planned jointly by the Twentieth Century Fund and the International Institute of Communications, and will have Elie Abel, Frank Stanton, Roger Tatarian and Henry Grunwald, of Time, Inc., representing the U.S.

Another independent response is the establishment of a Multinational News Agnecy (MNA). This plan actually calls for something more akin to a features service to be distributed throughout participating news agencies, but it is a very direct and substantial counter to the Non-Aligned Newspool and other such efforts on the part of Third World countries. The MNA was planned during a series of yearly conferences put on by the Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy of the Fletcher School, Tufts University. The Murrow Center has worked closely with the State Department a number of times in the past. (23)

CONCLUSION

As these attempts to address Third World grievances indicate, there is actually a fairly wide range of responses being made by the U.S. and the West, of varying kinds and magnitudes. But again, interpreting their meanings is not simply a matter of reading face value, at least in the case of the United States. William Harley has warned that "reprisals" and "vindictive behavior" might be forthcoming from the Third World if "some highly visible and substantial moves" are not made in fulfilling Western commitments to help less developed countries (LDCs) improve their communications capabilities." (24)

It is recognitions such as this which have largely determined the U.S. strategy on the NIIO, or so it would appear. In 1979, the year following this comment, U.S. WARC delegation Head Glen O. Robinson explained to Texan Representative James Collins, that "We have a selfish interest, if you will, in seeing

to it that other nations' interests are as fully satisfied as possible, because we need their agreement." (25) Such remarks may indicate a cooperative stance, but truly cooperative intent is another matter.

How can one tell? How far ahead are U.S. policy makers looking? Are they really receptive to the New Order? Is their posture one of compromise during a period of crises and confusion? Or is this a time buying tactic, an attempt to suspend the NIIO at its present state for unstated reasons?

The reorganization of USIA recently might signify a turn for the better, with the Carter Administration at any rate. After a decade of agency identity crises USIA policy makers and Congress finally acted upon the recognition that the cold war was over, the principle being that the Voice of America would be managed better in a new structure, along with the general assessment that policy information, cultural communication and radio broadcasting activities would be more effective if they were not all lumped together and conducted as a single public diplomacy operation. (26)

The reorganization was intended at least partially to take some of the cold war chill out of the agency and make it more sophisticated. From the generous tones of Director Reinhardt's speeches to UNESCO it might seem that the new agency, ICA, is even supposed to have more goodwill.

In either case the actuality seems to have fallen short of what is needed. The agency is undoubtedly more sophisticated diplomatically under the leadership of Reinhardt, but it has not lost all of its cold war habits. Many if not all of what one reads in the Western assessments of Third World countries' demands reduces them to authoritarian aims to control their journalists and restrict general freedom.

Although it is much more sophisticated than most, Reinhardt's recent formulation of the NIIO is based upon the polarity of authoritarianism

versus democracy: "The common theme in all this, I suggest, is that the remedy for injustice of ineffectiveness of world communication relationships must be more information and not less." (27) One of Leonard Sussman's more recent tracts on the NIIO devotes itself explicitly to reducing the issue to one of authoritarianism versus democracy. (28)

The problem with this kind of analysis is that it logically precludes a truly cooperative way of viewing the issue. By making the mistake of assuming all Third World governments to be simply authoritarain, then the only meaning that can be seen in a call for a new order is a revolutionary one. The implication is that the call is for swift, poorly planned change.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter Organizational Affairs George Dalley, for example, argues that what is more likely to work than a revolutionary approach is a "piecemeal," evolutionary approach. It would more effectively respond to individualized needs and be managerially possible. (29) This way training programs, equipment donations and technology transfer programs could be tailored to needs in a more rational, sound manner, he says.

He avoids the major point, however, and obscures the fact that there have been very few explicit calls for any sort of "revolution." Many of the countries involved, such as Taiwan, the Phillippines, Brazil and others have no interest in seeing the Capitalist system fall. On the other hand, Tanjug realistically seems itself not as a replacement for the big four news agencies, but only as a complement to them. Nor are most of the new socialistically oriented governments too ignorant to see that they need America's know-how and technology. What they need is aid, and freedom from debt pressures.

Most calls are in fact not for quick, revolutionary change, but are instead for fundamental change, structural change. Phil Harris, of Inter Press Service, has distinguished between cosmetic and structural change in the new

order. Cosmetic change is instituted by training programs, better coverage of Third World countries, technology "fixes," and etc., and it tends to perpetuate or worsen dependency. Structural change involves a transfer of communications resources in the context of a new international economic order (NIEO), and in a manner that neither gives away local control to the West nor increases Third World countries' debt problems in unmanageable ways.

Considering the troubles Third World countries have been having in large economic conferences recently, in planning and preparing for them, it seems unlikely that they feel any such program as a new order can come about in a day. It is realized that fundamental change is a step by step process. The point they wish to make is that unless such a structural approach is taken, then tactical, cosmetic handouts will only prolong or worsen their dependency on the industrialized West. Building requires planning, and if the NIIO is not planned above the table in international fora, then it will not be planned, not at least by anyone with Third World interests in mind. This is the major reason the call is for a "New Order."

With the viewpoint of Third World countries in mind, then, it appears that the continuous arguments over freedom of the press, far from spearheading a rational response to an attack on democratic freedoms, actually constitute a process of obscuring the real issues, precluding debate on them. It is difficult to know from what quarters the impetus for this over-simplified response comes.

Considering the scope of the global economic crisis, recently affirmed by Willy Brandt's international economy analysis and plea for cooperation, it seems that the West's common attribution of authoritarian bases to the call for an NIIO is not really a response to reality. And thus the offer of

an "evolutionary" approach with "cooperative" intent cannot work, in the long run. This could be due to TNC influence on government, to America's lack of firm foreign policy guidelines, to honestly expressed but somehow parochial views on the relationship between freedom of the press and individual political freedoms, or all of the above.

Whatever the causes are, the piecemeal program of offering training and technology certainly works to favor of TNCs. If enough time can be bought, and enough American know how equipment can be exported, then we will indeed, as Daniel Lerner once said, "Willy Nilly" become a global unit -- on an American TNC plan. It will be much more difficult to change then.

I am afraid that I have no conclusions to offer. I have tried only to identify some of the currents in the Western policy responses to the New International Information Order issue. It does seem evident, however, that to chart major policy goals, for the long run, a new approach must be taken. I would suggest the assessment of Edward Ploman, former Executive Director of the International Institute of Communications, as a starting point:

> "'Freedom of Information' now requires the same searching analysis as modern international relations theory has applied to the traditional notice of "State Sovereignty." Neither of these concepts represents an absolute, static, indivisible reality. The reification of abstractions is as unacceptable in these areas as in others." (30)

Footnotes

1) Schiller, Herbert, Compromising the New World Information Order. Mexico City: Instituto Latinamericano de Estudios Transnacianales, 1979, p. 5.

2) Read, William H., America's Mass Media Merchants. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1972.

3) Sweezy, Paul M., "Growing Wealth, Declining Power," Monthly Review. March, 1974, pp. 1-10.

4) Righter, Rosemary, Whose News?: Politics, The Press and the Third World. New York: Times Books, 1978. This book contains some valuable historical research, though the analysis is strongly biased in favor of the Western viewpoint.

5) Schiller, Herbert, "The Free Flow of Information -- For Whom?," in Mass Media Policies in Changing Cultures. George Gerbner, ed., New York: Wiley and Sons, inc., 1977, pp 105-117.

6) Landis, Fred, "The CIA and the Media: IAPA and the Jamaica Daily Gleaner," in Covert Action. No. 7, December, 1979, pp. 10-12.

7) Gunter, Jonathan, The United States and the Debate on the World Information Order. Report by the Academy for Educational Development, funded by USICA, Revised edition, June 1979, p. 30.

8) UNESCO, Records of the General Conference: 20th Session, October and November, 1978. Vol. 2: Reports, Paris: UNESCO, 1979. text contains generally interesting reading on the debates. 341.1 Un 38ger 1978 -- Vol. 2 p. 146.

9) UNESCO, Records of the General Conference: 20th Session, October and Novermber, 1978. Vol. 1: Resolutions, Paris: UNESCO, 1979, See article IX of the Declaration, page 103.

10) U.S. Government, UNESCO and Freedom of Information. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, First Session, July 9, 1979, p. 61.

11) Nordenstreng, Kaarle "Behind the Semantics -- A Strategic Design," in Journal of Communications. Spring, 1979, Vol. 29:2, p. 197.

12) UNESCO, Reports on the 20th Session, Vol. 2, Op Cit. p. 145.

13) Ganley, Oswald, "International Data Flows: Shall We Have International Cooperation?" in Information Societies: Comparing the Japanese and American Experiences. Alex Edelstein, John Bowes, and Sheldon Harseldon, eds., Seattle: International Communications Center, 1978, pp. 3-8.

14) Sasaki, Ken-ichi, The Role of News Agencies in the New World Information Order. Paper presented at the U.S. -- Japan Communication Symposium, Boston, October, 1979. p. 7

15) Reinhardt, John E. Report of the United States Delegation to the 20th Session of the General Conference of UNESCO. Paris, France. October 24-November 28, 1978. Submitted to the Secretary of State. pp. 41-42.

16) Kroloff, George, and Scott Cohen, The New World Information Order. A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Nov. 1977. p. 1.

17) Harley, William G., The New World Information Order: Confrontation or Cooperation with the Third World -- An American View. Report commissioned by the Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, for a U.S.--Japan Symposium on International Communications, Boston, October, 1979. p. 23.

18) Tatarian, Roger, Conference Rapporteur's Summary of the 43rd Annual Conference of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Athens, Georgia, December, 1979. p. 1.

19) Harley, William, G., Op Cit.

20) U.S. Government, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations in 1980. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session. pp. 320-321.

21) Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Technology and Change in Modern Communications. a document of the McBride Commission, Internation Commission for the Study of Communications Problems, UNESCO. no. 84. p. 13.

22) Twentieth Century Fund, undated press release issued in Dec. 1979.

23) Tatarian, Roger, "The Multinational News Agency," Paper Commissioned by the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts, University, for a Feasibility Conference in New York, September, 12-14, 1979.

24) Quoted in Agee, Warren K., "Drying Streams of International News: Journalism Organizations Respond to Threats to Press Freedom." Paper presented to the International Communications Division of the Association for Education in Journalism Annual Convention, Houston, Texas, August 1979.

25) U.S. Government, 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference-Oversight. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, ouse of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, April 4, 1979. p. 23.

26) U.S. Government, Public Diplomacy and the Future. Testimony of Frank Stanton before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, 1977. pp. 231-238,

27) Reinhardt, John E. Towards an Acceptable Concept of the New World Information Order, An address prepared for delivery by Ambassador John E. Reinhardt at the U.S.-Japan Symposim, Boston, October, 1979.

28) Sussman, Leonard, "Press Freedom in 1978: Journalists Suffered Even as General Freedom Rose," in Freedom at Issue, Jan.-Feb., 1979, #49, pp. 15-20.

29) Daley, George A. Third World Challenge to World Communications. Statement before the Subcommittee for International Organization Affairs of the House of Representatives, July 19, 1979. Department of State, Current Policy Paper, No. 103. p. 5.

30) Ploman, Edward W. "Satellite Broadcasting, National Sovereignty, and the Free Flow of Information," in Nordenstreng and Schiller, eds., National Sovereignty and International Communications. Norwood: Ablex, 1979. p. 162.

Bibliography

Agee, Warren K., "Drying Streams of International News: Journalism Organizations Respond to Threats to Press Freedom." Paper presented to the International Communications Division of the Association for Education in Journalism Annual Convention, Houston, Texas, August 1979.

Daley, George A. "Third World Challenge to World Communications," in Current Policy Paper, No. 103, Department of State, Statement before the Subcommittee for International Organization Affairs of the House of Representatives, July 19, 1979.

Ganley, Oswald, "International Data Flows: Shall we Have International Cooperation?" in Information Societies: Comparing the Japanese and American Experiences. Alex Edelstein, John Bowes, and Sheldon Harsel, eds., Seattle: International Communications Center, 1978.

Gunter, Johnathan, The United States and the Debate on the World Information Order. Report by the Academy for Educational Development, funded by USICA, Revised edition, June 1979.

Harley, William G., The New World Information Order: Confrontation or Cooperation with the Third World--An American View. Report commissioned by the Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, for a U.S.--Japan Symposium on International Communications, Boston, October, 1979.

Kroloff, George, and Scott Cohen, The New World Information Order. A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, November 1977.

Landis, Fred, "The CIA and the Media: IAPA and the Jamaica Daily Gleaner," in Covert Action. No. 7, December, 1979.

Nordenstreng, Kaarle "Behind the Semantics -- A Strategic Design," in Journal of Communications. Spring, 1979, Vol. 29:2.

Ploman, Edward, W. "Satellite Broadcasting, National Sovereignty, and the Free Flow of Information," in Nordenstreng and Schiller, eds., National Sovereignty and International Communications. Norwood: Ablex, 1979.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, Technology and Change in Modern Communications. a document of the International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems, UNESCO, no. 84.

Read, William H. America's Mass Media Merchants. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1972.

Reinhardt, John E. Towards an Acceptable Concept of the New World Information Order. An address prepared for delivery by Ambassador John E. Reinhardt at the U.S.--Japan Symposium, Boston, October, 1979.

Reinhardt, John E. Report of the United States Delegation to the 20th Session of the General Conference of UNESCO. Paris, France, October 24--November 28, 1978. Submitted to the Secretary of State.

Righter, Rosemary, Whose News?: Politics, The Press and the Third World. New York: Times Books, 1978.

Sasaki, Ken-ichi, The Role of News Agencies in the New World Information Order. Paper presented at the U.S.--Japan Symposium, Boston, October, 1979.

Schiller, Herbert, Compromising the New World Information Order. Mexico City: Instituto Latinamericano de Estudios Transnacionales, 1979.

" " "The Free Flow of Information--For Whom?" in Mass Media Policies in Changing Cultures. George Gerbner, ed., New York: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1977, pp. 105-117.

Sussman, Leonard, "Press Freedom in 1978: Journalists Suffered Even as General Freedom Rose," in Freedom at Issue, Jan.-Feb., 1979, #49, pp. 15-20.

Tatarian, Roger, Conference Rapporteur's Summary of the 43rd Annual Conference of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, Athens, Georgia, December, 1979.

" " "The Multinational News Agency," Paper Commissioned by the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts, University, for a Feasibility Conference in New York, September 12-14, 1979.

Twentieth Century Fund, undated press release issued in Dec. 1979.

UNESCO, Records of the General Conference: 20th Session, October and November, 1978, Vol. 1: Resolutions, Paris: UNESCO, 1979.

UNESCO, Records of the General Conference: 20th Session, October and November, 1978, Vol. 2: Reports, Paris: UNESCO, 1979.

United States Government, Departments of State, Justice and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations in 1980. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session. pp. 320-321.

United States Government, UNESCO and Freedom of Information. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, July 9, 1979.

United States Government, 1979 World "dministrative Radio Conference--Oversight. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, April 4, 1979.